Multi-Backbone Self-Supervised Ensembles for Audio Deepfake Detection and a Cross-Track Analysis of Generation-Detection Asymmetry
Authors: Seunghyun Kim, Junghyun Kim, Jiyoung Woo
Published: 2026-08-03 07:04:51+00:00
Comment: Accepted at CLEF 2026, ImageCLEF-Deepfake task. Published in CEUR-WS CLEF 2026 Working Notes
AI Summary
This paper presents team Go-To-Germany's participation in the ImageCLEF 2026 Audio Deepfake Detection and Generation task. Their detection system, a four-backbone self-supervised learning ensemble, achieved a high score of 0.9522, perfectly identifying participant-generated deepfakes. A cross-track analysis revealed a significant asymmetry: while the detection system was highly effective, their first-ranked generation entry still evaded a substantial percentage of detectors, highlighting an inherent challenge in deepfake detection.
Abstract
This paper describes the participation of team Go-To-Germany in the ImageCLEF 2026 Audio Deepfake Detection and Generation task. Our detection system, built on a four-backbone self-supervised learning (SSL) ensemble combining WavLM-Large, Wav2Vec2-XLS-R-300M, ECAPA-TDNN, and x-vector representations, achieved a final score of 0.9522 on the official ImageCLEF 2026 evaluation, with perfect accuracy (1.0000) on participant-generated deepfakes and 0.8875 on the held-out organizer ground-truth real data. For the Generation sub-task, our official team submission, an F5-TTS v1 baseline processed with a uniform reverberation pass and submitted as a deliberate anti-forensic probe, ranked first with a final score of 0.4304 (word error rate (WER) 4.99%, character error rate (CER) 2.07%); details of our four-model program (GLM-TTS, F5-TTS, XTTS v2, CosyVoice3), from which the official entry was drawn, appear in the paper. We present a cross-track analysis revealing a pronounced asymmetry: our detection system identifies 100% of participant-generated deepfakes, while our official generation entry, despite ranking first in the Audio Generation sub-task and evading 61.4% and 56.2% of participant and organizer detectors, attains a Final Score of 0.4304 against 0.9522 on the Detection side. We further report falsification-based ablation experiments (LOSO 56-speaker cross-validation, three-region backbone geometry, bootstrap confidence intervals, and PCA analysis) that motivate our architectural-insurance hypothesis for multi-backbone SSL ensembling. We complement these results with five cross-track insights and five pre-registered falsification experiments connecting generation-side evasion to detection-side design decisions, and we openly report an 11.25% false-positive gap on held-out organizer real recordings as the principal open challenge for deployment.